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Background Theories and Total Science
P. D. Magnus†
Background theories in science are used both to prove and to disprove that theory
choice is underdetermined by data. The alleged proof appeals to the fact that exper-
iments to decide between theories typically require auxiliary assumptions from other
theories. If this generates a kind of underdetermination, it shows that standards of
scientific inference are fallible and must be appropriately contextualized. The alleged
disproof appeals to the possibility of suitable background theories to show that no
theory choice can be timelessly or noncontextually underdetermined: Foreground the-
ories might be distinguished against different backgrounds. Philosophers have often
replied to such a disproof by focussing their attention not on theories but on Total
Sciences. If empirically equivalent Total Sciences were at stake, then there would be
no background against which they could be differentiated. I offer several reasons to
think that Total Science is a philosophers’ fiction. No respectable underdetermination
can be based on it.
1. A Word about Terminology. In this paper, I am concerned with un-
derdetermination arguments that appeal to the role of background as-
sumptions and auxiliary hypotheses in science. As such, there are forms
of underdetermination that don’t concern me here. To put it in a general
form, however, we can say that underdetermination obtains when sci-
entists are unable to responsibly decide between rival theories. Following
a common characterization of underdetermination, say formally that un-
derdetermination obtains for a set of rival theories, a standard for what
would count as responsible theory choice, and a set of circumstances in
which the standard allows no responsible choice among the rival theories.1
2. How Auxiliary Theories Make Inference Less than Certain. The fa-
miliar Duhemian argument for underdetermination begins with the ob-
servation that experiments in modern science often require appeal to aux-
iliary assumptions for their probative force. For the sake of concreteness,
To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University at Albany,
SUNY, Albany, New York 12222; e-mail: pmagnus@fecundity.com.
1. I have developed this framework at greater length elsewhere (2003; 2005a; 2005b).
For a similar characterization of underdetermination, see Laudan 1998.
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Figure 1. (a) If the Earth were flat, then an observer on the shore would see both the
mast and prow of the ship if he could see either. (b) Since the Earth is round, the
observer sees the mast even when the hull is hidden behind the curve of the Earth.
consider the claim that the Earth is flat and the counter-claim that the
Earth is round—less colloquially, that the Earth is an oblate spheroid.
Call these claims and respectively. There have been many adherentsT TF R
of , of course, and many attempts to demonstrate its superiority overTR
. Copernicus provides a typical argument:TF
This [spherical] form of the sea is also discerned by sailors, seeing
that land is visible from the top of the mast, even when it cannot be
seen from the deck of the ship. And conversely if a light is held on
the top of the mast, it appears to those on the shore to gradually
descend as the ship moves away from land, until at last it disappears
like the setting sun. (De Revolutionibus Bk. I ch. 2, author’s
translation)
The idea is simple enough. If the sea were flat, then an observer who
could see a ship clearly should be able to see both the hull and the mast,
as in Figure 1a.
Contrariwise, since the sea is curved, an observer may see the mast
even at a distance at which the hull is not visible, as in Figure 1b. The
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Figure 2. (a) Light beams sag between the ship and the observer, so the prow of the
ship is occulted by water even as the mast is visible. (b) As the ship approaches, the
observer can see both the prow and the mast.
latter of these is observed, and the observation decides between these two
depictions. The catch is this: The test implicitly assumes that light travels
in a straight line—but of course the rectilinear propagation of light is
independent of and .T TF R
Without the implicit assumption, the observation may not favor .TR
Suppose is true—the Earth is flat—but that light sags slightly betweenTF
the object and the observer, curving down toward the surface of the Earth.
At a distance, the light from the hull of the ship may sag down into the
water while the light from the mast reaches the observer. Thus, the ob-
server sees the mast even as the hull has passed from view. This situation,
depicted in Figure 2, would yield the relevant observation.2
Call the assumption that light travels in a straight line , and call theTL
observation of the mast of the ship when the hull is out of sight O.
Although O is offered as evidence of over against , the best it canT TR F
2. This example appears in Copi and Cohen’s introductory logic, wherein the authors
attribute it to C. L. Stevenson. They invoke it to show that no ‘crucial experiment’
can be deductively binding, but concede, “Within the framework of accepted scientific
theory that we are not concerned to question, a hypothesis can be subjected to a crucial
experiment” (1990, 447).
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do is show that if light travels in a straight line then the Earth is round.
One may conclude that this conditional is true, but not that is true orTR
that is false.TL
Cases like this are used to underwrite what is sometimes called the
Duhem-Quine (or DQ) Thesis: Theories are not tested in isolation.3 As
Quine puts it, theories “face the tribunal of sense experience not individ-
ually but as a corporate body” (1953, 41). The point may be stated as a
lesson about underdetermination. The experiment was aimed to decide
between and . This theory choice is underdetermined for a standardT TR F
of judgement that denies you the assumption ; such a meager standardTL
allows you only to conclude only . Worse still—since there is aT r TL R
great deal more to optics than the rectilinear propagation of light—the
inference involves still other auxiliary assumptions , , and so on. IfT TM N
the DQ Thesis is correct, then the observation allows you only to conclude
the rather uninteresting conditional .. . .(T & T & T & ) r TL M N R
If we treat theory choice as a deductive inference from the evidence, O
only yields given an indefinite number of other assumptions. We mightTR
have arrived at this conclusion directly. Let L be the set .T , T , T , . . .L M N
By hypothesis, , and there is no such that(O & L) r T M O L (O &R
. We observe O. These assumptions validly entail but leaveM ) r T L r TR R
indeterminate. Suspiciously, the conclusion follows without any con-TR
sideration of the content of L, O, and and without any reflection onTR
methodology or confirmation.
The crux of the matter is whether standards of responsible judgement
should lead you to assume L or treat it as being as much in question as
. One might argue that the right standards should promise us certainty.TR
is open to revision, so conclusions drawn on the basis of it are a fortioriTL
fallible. But no certain knowledge is to be had. Whether we may rely on
auxiliary hypotheses to decide between rival theories depends on their
actual content and on our epistemic situation. Little more can be said in
the abstract. The Duhemian argument seems to fail.
2.1. Finding Duhem in the Duhemian Argument. Although Quine is of-
ten cited as having established the force of underdetermination in ‘Two
Dogmas of Empiricism’, he writes there that the “doctrine was well argued
by Duhem” and offers it without much positive argument (1953, 41, note
17). Admittedly, Duhem does seem to draw a strong conclusion. He writes
3. The phrase ‘Duhem-Quine Thesis’ is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘underde-
termination’ (see, e.g., Kourany 2003, 23). Given the general characterization of un-
derdetermination that I gave in Section 1, the DQ Thesis and the problem of empirically
equivalent rival theories count as varieties of (rather than synonyms for)
underdetermination.
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“that comparison is established necessarily between the whole of theory
and the whole of experimental facts” (1954, 208).4 It is important to note,
however, that this passage is a quick summary of his position, offered
after it had been developed with greater care in prior sections. Moreover,
Duhem did not see his holism as entailing any pernicious underdeter-
mination. It does mean that theory choice cannot be a matter of deductive
or logical certainty, but it leaves room for fallible theory choice. Duhem
explains that “what impels the physicist to act thus is not logical necessity.
It would be awkward and ill inspired for him to do otherwise, but it would
not be doing something logically absurd” (1954, 211).
We should, of course, acknowledge that scientific theory choice is not
a matter of deduction. It lacks even the plausible pretense of certainty.
Duhemian concerns show us that, given a decontextualized standard of
judgement, underdetermination is rampant. If there are standards of good
sense that allow querists in a context to decide between theories, as Duhem
thought, then the underdetermination disappears when we consider
choices relative to those standards. Duhem is, I concede, not always as
clear on this point as he could be, and commentators have often reca-
pitulated the ambiguity.5
Duhem thinks that “good sense” should save the physicist from awk-
wardness and ill inspiration, but also that
these reasons of good sense do not impose themselves with the same
implacable rigor that the prescriptions of logic do. There is something
vague and uncertain about them; they do not reveal themselves at
the same time with the same degree of clarity to all minds. Hence
the possibility of lengthy quarrels between the adherents of an old
system and the partisans of a new doctrine, each camp claiming to
have good sense on its side, each finding the reasons of the adversary
inadequate. (1954, 217)
This reveals possibilities for underdetermination. On the cusp of contro-
versies, the evidence will be insufficient to settle matters between rival
camps—not because many scientists are undecided between rival views,
but because good sense is vague enough to permit disagreement. Yet, new
evidence is collected, old evidence is reconsidered, and each doctrine is
4. The critical turns in Duhem’s argument occur in his Chapter 6, Sections 2–3, 8.
5. For instance, Laudan treats what can “carry logical weight” as an issue of whether
“a scientist is forced to relinquish” an hypothesis. If the responsible theory choice is
the choice that a scientist is forced to make, underdetermination will be ubiquitous.
Yet Laudan also allows for responsible choice in a less draconian sense; he concedes
that one experiment he considers “would cause a rational person to cease to expound
[a certain hypothesis]” (1965, 299).
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run through its paces. In time, the question may be settled. There is not
some instant in time before which the old theory is the reasonable choice
and after which the contender is triumphant, but agreement may be se-
cured by an array of new evidence along with the inconstant nudgings of
good sense.6 Note, however, that this agreement may come about even
though the theories in question still rely on auxiliaries, and reasonable
disagreement may occur even when the interlocutors agree on the relevant
auxiliaries. There is a kind of underdetermination that, as Duhem might
say, follows from the vagueness of good sense, but it is neither ubiquitous
nor established by scientists’ reliance on background theory.
3. How Auxiliary Theories Make Empirical Equivalence Impossible. In
the last decade or so, the prevalence of background assumptions has
underwritten arguments against underdetermination—principally in dis-
cussions following Laudan and Leplin (1991).7 Scientists utilize a host of
auxiliary assumptions and collateral information in performing experi-
ments, as is readily seen by considering examples like the one in the
previous section. Suppose, then, that two theories L and make no′L
predictions that would allow us to differentiate between them. This em-
pirical equivalence might be taken to warrant a conclusion that the choice
between L and is underdetermined. What would the scope of this′L
underdetermination be? It would include our present circumstance, but
we may imagine circumstances it would not include. Suppose we learned
that and for some observable phenomenon O. The′(L r O) (L r ¬O)
theories would not then be empirically equivalent, and we could respon-
sibly decide between them.
Of course, suitable revision of the rival theories would repeat the un-
derdetermination at the level of theory cum background theory. We would
be able to decide between L and , but the choice between′L L & (L r
and would remain underde-′ ′ ′O) & (L r ¬O) L & (L r ¬O) & (L r O)
termined. Yet why do we believe and ? Surely not merely′(L r O) (L r ¬O)
because they would defuse the underdetermination between L and ! Say′L
that we believe them because they are entailed (with some assumptions
about initial conditions) by a well-tested and widely-believed background
theory X. We may attempt to cook up some alternate that would enjoy′X
the same empirical support as X but entail , but there′(L r ¬O) & (L r O)
6. This is roughly what Kitcher (1993, Chapter 6) calls the ‘compromise model’ of
scientific change.
7. Although the argument is not original to Laudan and Leplin, they have pressed it
with the greatest vigor. Boyd considers it a “standard rebuttal” to empiricism and
concedes that the obvious answer is to shift attention to Total Sciences (1982, 650–
651). See also Churchland 1985, 38.
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is no guarantee that this will be possible. The theory X may have system-
atic connections to other parts of science, such that any sufficiently′X
different to work here would introduce a panoply of anomalies.
Earman objects to Laudan and Leplin’s argument in this way: Either
the X appealed to is a contestable hypothesis like L and or it is not.′L
If the former, then the rivals under consideration are no longer L and
—the rivals are instead and . “The result is sidestepped′ ′L (L & X ) (L & X )
. . . but that is changing the subject since what counts as the hypothesis
has been changed.” If the latter, then X is presumed. This would amount
to dogmatism, since auxiliaries like X “must go beyond the empirical
evidence . . . and thus their epistemic status will be just as open to ques-
tion as that of the [hypotheses]” (1993, 35).
I don’t think that there is a sharp point to either horn of this dilemma.
First: Even if Earman were right that this changes the subject, that doesn’t
make it legerdemain. It is perfectly legitimate to substitute a determinable
theory choice for an underdetermined one, a tractable problem for an
insoluble one.8 Second: The problem is soluble, because X does not stand
in the same need of justification as L or . The auxiliary goes beyond′L
the evidence and so too is open to question—it is not in principle shielded
from scrutiny.9 What’s methodologically crucial is that a community or
an individual scientist may hold an accepted background theory fixed for
the purpose of some investigation. As Norton (2003) argues, we can’t
understand inductive inference if we don’t recognize the role of material
assumptions.
4. The Move to Total Science. At this point, many philosophers are
tempted to ask about the choice not between theories but between pack-
ages of Total Science. A Total Science is the collected body of all scientific
knowledge at a time. Some authors call this a ‘total theory,’ but this is
at best misleading. As I argue below, a Total Science is not a scientific
theory in any ordinary sense.
Adding a theory T to a given Total Science produces a new, differentS
Total Science. Thinking of theories as sets of propositions, one might
think of a Total Science as the union of all the theories known to science
and think of the combination as . Thinking of theories instead asS ∪ T
sets of models, one might think of a Total Science as the intersection of
known theories and think of the combination as . In order to remainS ∩ T
neutral between these and more exotic possibilities, let stand for(S  X )
8. If you can’t stop the rain, get an umbrella—and so on.
9. Going beyond evidence is actually beside the point, since querists may call the
evidence itself into question as needed.
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the resultant Total Science when theory or observation X is added to Total
Science .10S
Let the initial state of Science prior to any knowledge of L, , or X′L
be given by . The choice between and is, by assumption,′S (S  L) (S  L )
underdetermined. This underdetermination cannot be resolved by ap-
pealing to X. Appeal to X is a non sequitur, since X is not part of the
Total Science . If we learned X from some experiment, then we wouldS
transition to a different total science. That choice would be between
and . It would not be underdetermined, true,′((S  X )  L) ((S  X )  L )
but that is a different choice between different Total Sciences. Perhaps
the choice of one from ′{(S  L), (S  L ), ((S  X )  L), ((S  X )
is not underdetermined, but that too is beside the point. On this′ L )}
approach, strong conclusions are drawn from underdetermination that
obtains between empirically equivalent Total Sciences.
Several authors appeal to Total Science in this way. Quine said, “The
unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (1953, 42). Hoefer
and Rosenberg, mindful of Quine, write that “the thesis of underdeter-
mination of theory by evidence is about empirically adequate total sci-
ence” and conclude rightly “that Laudan and Leplin’s arguments for the
defeasibility of empirical equivalence have no application in the context
of systems of the world”—that is, in the context of Total Sciences (1994,
594, 598). Kukla deploys the notion of Total Science and concludes: “The
prima facie case has been stated. The burden of proof is on [defenders of
the Laudan and Leplin argument] to show why the total sciences version
of the underdetermination argument fails” (1998, 66).
This can be seen as a reformulation of the Duhemian argument, one
that cannot be answered merely by an appeal to fallibilism. Even allowing
that it is legitimate to appeal to background theories, empirically equiv-
alent Total Sciences cannot be distinguished by some empirical test be-
cause all of the available background theories are already included in each
Total Science. At the outset, I said that underdetermination concerned
the choice among rival theories. If we substitute Total Sciences for theories,
it’s hard to make sense of choices—underdetermined or otherwise.
In the remainder of the paper, I offer several argument to undercut the
move from theories to Total Sciences.
We could never in any meaningful sense choose between Total Sciences.
Querists never face choices between Total Sciences. In actual enquiry, there
10. Churchland defines a “global theory” as the “global configuration of synaptic
weights” in the neural networks of a scientist’s brain (1989, 188). If we understand
this as a Total Science, giving an appropriate construal of ‘ ’ will be no simple matter—
yet there must be some construal, since the scientist’s brain certainly adopts some
global configuration after she makes an observation.
1072 P. D. MAGNUS
is some matter in question and other matters presumed. It is possible, of
course, that a querist should call some assumption into question. Nev-
ertheless, there is no moment when everything is up for grabs. This means
that underdetermination about Total Sciences could have no practical
upshot whatsoever. More than that, underdetermination between Total
Sciences could not have any part in a methodology we could actually
employ. A real method must tell us where to go from here. The under-
determination of Total Science for the abstract querist is at too far a
remove from enquiry and methodology to hold lessons for concrete que-
rists like us.
Although our present science is often treated implicitly as a Total Science,
it seems likely that actual science doesn’t constitute a well-defined Total
Science. It is fair to ask what Total Science would look like. Kukla writes
that “a total science is nothing more or less than the conjunction of any
‘partial’ theory and all the auxiliary theories that we deem to be permis-
sible. It does not matter which partial theory we begin with—the end
result will be the same” (1996, 143, emphasis added). Yet there is no
guarantee that this conjunction either exists or is well-defined. Philoso-
phers’ examples usually take the the form of comparing the usual Total
Science with a slight revision of the same; as with the well-worn example
of flat space versus curved space with appropriate corrections, we are
given single theories as stand-ins for Total Sciences. We are invited to
think that a Total Science is something we understand well enough. Since
there is a body of scientific knowledge, then its makes sense to think of
it collected at a time—right?
Whom would we ask and where would we look if we wished to know
the state of Total Science? Perhaps Total Science includes only matters
about which all scientists agree. Complete consensus is a rare thing,
though, so this would count only the tiniest subset of what might plausibly
be billed as scientific knowledge. This may miss the point, since under-
determination of can be taken as a lesson about the situation of an in-
dividual querist.11 Even so, it is hard to know how the beliefs of a single
scientist could be seen as a Total Science. The scientist may have some
sense of which beliefs she believes qua scientist and which ones she believes
qua citizen or consumer, but this will not be a sharp division. Moreover,
what she believes qua scientist may be inconsistent; she believes the theory
of relativity, but also quantum mechanics. It is impossible, I suggest, to
11. It is tempting to say that there is no principled epistemic difference between un-
derdetermination for the individual and for the community, but Longino argues that
underdetermination is resolved by socially accepted background assumptions (1990).
Given my purposes here, this might go either way.
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sum up her beliefs as a Total Science—if she does not believe even one
Total Science, why should it matter if she could not decide between several?
Total Sciences could not be compared to evidence, so they could neither
be determined nor underdetermined by data. Underdetermination of Total
Science is often said to obtain between empirically adequate and equiv-
alent Total Sciences. We can think of these wholly adequate Total Sciences
as sciences of the end times, sciences which have answered all empirical
questions as adequately as questions can be answered. Thinking in these
terms makes it irrelevant that present actual science doesn’t constitute a
Total Science,12 but it exacerbates the disconnect between underdeter-
mination and methodology. Hoefer and Rosenberg concede that “we can
never be in a position to know a purportedly empirically adequate total
theory is in fact a total theory or empirically adequate. But this episte-
mological truism does not undercut the conceptual point that two em-
pirically adequate total theories would be nondefeasibly underdetermined
by the evidence” (1994, 595).13 This conceptual point that some Total
Sciences may be “nondefeasibly underdetermined” loses its force if no
Total Sciences could ever be defeasibly determined.
The appeal to Total Science precludes the invocation of background
theories by packaging the background theories in the rival Total Sciences.
Yet since observations, data, and the outcome of our experiments are also
part of our Total Science, rival Total Sciences could never be compared
against the evidence—there is no evidence outside of the Total Sciences
against which they could be compared! Underdetermination of Total Sci-
ences entered our discussion as a radical form of the underdetermination
of theory by data, but it seems reasonable to think that only things that
can be compared to data can be underdetermined by data.
For there to be a well-defined Total Science, science must be unified in
an implausibly strong sense. Kukla suggests that the move to Total Science
is sufficient to shift the burden of proof. Yet there is no clear reason why
the move should be presumptively legitimate. For the last two decades at
least, a growing number of philosophers have argued for a “picture of
science as radically fractured and disunified” (Dupré 1996, 101).14 Perhaps,
as Hacking writes, “[t]he unity of science is rooted in an overarching
metaphysical thought that expresses not a thesis but a sentiment” (1996,
12. Since we must still imagine some future actual science constituting a Total Science,
the previous objection is not entirely vitiated. Will some future state of science be so
different from its present state?
13. They attribute this ‘truism’ to personal correspondence with Leplin.
14. On the disunity of science, see also: Dupré 1983, Galison and Stump 1996, and
Cartwright 1999.
1074 P. D. MAGNUS
44). It is only when we are in the grip of that sentiment that Total Science
seems a plausible enough thing to constitute even a prima facie case.
Collecting the various sciences into one Total Science would require
not just unity, but unity of a rather extreme kind. The view that science
is utterly fractured and disunified is not the only alternative to such mono-
lithic unity. It may be that special sciences are integrated, in the sense that
they mesh together where their domains overlap (Farber 2000), but that
they are not so unified that they can be collected altogether as a Total
Science.
Underdetermination seems to suppose that there are two or more maxi-
mally good Total Sciences, but there is no guarantee that epistemic virtue
provides that kind of ordering relation. Even the unity of science would
not necessarily entail the existence of a final, fully adequate Total Science.
As Paul Churchland suggests: “Just as there is no largest positive integer,
it may be that there is no best theory. It may be that, for any theory
whatsoever, there is always an even better theory, and so ad infinitum”
(1985, 46). If possible states of science stand in an ordering relation such
that there is no supremum, then there would be no final sciences—a fortiori
not the two or more required for underdetermination.
5. Conclusion. The role of background theories in science ameliorates
more than it aggravates problems of underdetermination. Duhemian con-
siderations only amount to pernicious underdetermination if we demand
that scientific theory choice be timeless and noncontextual. When we
acknowledge that ampliative inference is fallible and contextual, the bug-
bear is beaten back. Underdetermination slinks away defeated and will
not rally even when the banner of Total Sciences is raised.
REFERENCES
Boyd, Richard N. (1982), “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology”, in Ronald
Giere and Peter Asquith (eds.), PSA 1980: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the
Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science
Association, 613–662.
Cartwright, Nancy (1999), The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copi, Irving M., and Carl Cohen (1990), Introduction to Logic. New York: Macmillan.
Churchland, Paul M. (1985), “The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the
Superempirical Virtues”, in Paul M. Churchland and Clifford A. Hooker (eds.), Images
of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 35–47.
——— (1989), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of
Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Duhem, Pierre ([1916] 1954), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Reprint. Translated
by P. P. Wiener. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Originally published
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